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FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
pretation of enlistment contracts. Because Reamer viewed the enlist-
ment contract in terms of ordinary contract law, it may reflect some
flexibility in the Fourth Circuit's consideration of military enlistment
contracts.
The D.C. Circuit has given a flexible consideration of enlistment
contracts in Larionoff and holds that Congress did not have the power
to alter the bonus provisions in reenlistment contracts. Because it
recognizes an enlistee's right to enforce a promise he has contracted
for, Larionoff seems to be a better adjudication of the issue of VRBs
than Carini. Furthermore, the D.C. Circuit's decision in Larionoff
represents the growing trend of courts to interpret enlistment con-
tracts as true contracts." While Larionoff is limited to cases in which
Congress has not justified its actions through legitimate supervening
public policy, it is valuable authority for recognizing the enlistee's
rights in the enforcement of his enlistment contract. Although the
Fourth Circuit has not altered its interpretation of military enlist-
ment contracts to accord with Larionoff, it does treat enlistment
contracts as ordinary contracts in cases like Reamer where there is a
dispute over the interpretation of the language. The volunteer Army
has placed an increased importance on military enlistment con-
tracts. 3 This, in turn, may present more opportunities for the Fourth




A. Use and Derivative Use Immunity to Protect the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in a Wagering Tax Refund Suit.
In a suit for the refund of federal wagering taxes, a taxpayer may
find himself on the horns of a dilemma. Because the Commissioner
assesses taxes on both legal and illegal wagers,' the production of
F.2d at 741, while in Reamer the Fourth Circuit interpreted a provision within the
contract adversely to the enlistee's assertions. 532 F.2d at 352.
11 See note 31 supra.
4 See text accompanying notes 1-5 supra.
I.R.C. §§ 4401(a) and 4404 impose a two percent excise tax on wagers placed
within the United States or by United States citizens. Until 1974, the excise tax was
ten percent of the gross wagers. I.R.C. § 4401(a) (1954) (amended 1974). To facilitate
collection of this tax, the government imposes strict requirements upon wagerers. They
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evidence relating to illegal betting may be necessary to support a
claim for a refund. The taxpayer must refuse to produce this evi-
dence, however, if he is to avoid criminal liability for violation of
gambling laws.2 Since refusal to produce evidence may result in dis-
missal of his refund suit,3 forcing a taxpayer to choose between possi-
ble criminal liability or dismissal of his refund suit raises fifth
amendment issues.
In Shaffer v. United States,4 the Fourth Circuit remedied this
dilemma by directing the district court to defer the refund suit until
the government granted use and derivative use immunity' or until all
must register with the Treasury Department, I.R.C. § 4412, keep daily records, I.R.C.
§ 4403, and permit inspection of those records. I.R.C. § 4423. Payment of the tax does
not exempt the wagerer from prosecution for violation of gambling laws. I.R.C. § 4422.
For the history of the statutes, see Chenoweth, A Judicial Balance Sheet for the
Federal Gambling Tax, 53 Nw. U.L. REv. 457 (1958).
The Commissioner collects wagering taxes through the assessment procedure.
I.R.C. § 6303. Under this procedure, a lien on the taxpayer's property arises when the
assessment is made, I.R.C. § 6322, and if the person liable for the tax does not pay it
within ten days, the Commissioner may collect the tax by seizing the property, I.R.C.
§ 6331, and selling it. I.R.C. § 6335.
All states and the federal government regulate gambling through criminal stat-
utes. For a list of the state statutes, see Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 44-
45 n.5 (1968). For examples of federal statutes, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 1302 (mailing of lottery
tickets prohibited), 1952 (interstate distribution of gambling proceeds which have not
been taxed prohibited), 1953 (interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia pro-
hibited), 1955 (1970) (operation of a gambling business illegal under state law prohib-
ited).
FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(c) provides that a court may dismiss an action or enter
a judgment by default against the disobedient party for failure to comply with an order
compelling discovery.
528 F.2d 920 (4th Cir. 1975).
Although the court said "use immunity," 528 F.2d at 920, it probably meant
"use and derivative use immunity." Mr. Justice Douglas also used the shortened form
in Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 466 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Prosecutors may grant three types of immunity-use immunity, which precludes
the use of the testimony in a subsequent proceeding; derivative use immunity, which
prohibits the use of evidence derived from the testimony; or transactional immunity,
which provides immunity from prosecution for offenses related to the testimony. See
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 443 (1972). If a witness testifies under use and
derivative use immunity, the prosecutor in any subsequent proceeding must prove that
his evidence is untainted by the testimony. 406 U.S. at 461-62. Under the fifth amend-
ment, a grant of use and derivative use immunity is sufficient to compel self-
incriminating testimony. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892). The
federal government may grant immunity from state prosecutions under the supremacy
clause. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm., 378 U.S. 52, 73 (1964). See Note, Resolving
Tensions Between Constitutional Rights: Use Immunity in Concurrent, or Related
Proceedings, 76 COLUM. L. Rzv. 674, 699-702 (1976); see generally Note, The Scope of
Testimonial Immunity Under the Fifth Amendment: Kastigar v. United States, 6
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applicable statutes of limitation had expired.' In Shaffer, the tax-
payer, who was under indictment on federal gambling charges, sued
in district court to obtain a refund of his partial payment of a wager-
ing tax assessment.8 During discovery, the plaintiff refused to answer
certain questions or to produce certain records9 relating to the compu-
Loy.L.A.L. REv. 350 (1973); Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Compelled Testi-
mony: Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 Vi.L. L. Rlv. 470 (1974).
528 F.2d at 922.
The Tax Court lacks jurisdiction over excise tax cases because its jurisdiction is
limited to cases in which the taxpayer received a notice of deficiency. Flora v. United
States, 362 U.S. 145, 175 n.38 (1960); Dudley v. Commissioner, 258 F.2d 182, 183-84
(3d Cir. 1958); see note 1 supra. I.R.C. § 6212 authorizes deficiency notices only for
income tax, estate tax, gift tax, taxes on private foundations and taxes on qualified
pension plans. See 9 J. MERTEN, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATON § 50.08 (1971).
Unlike the federal income tax, the wagering tax is divisible. A taxpayer may pay
a portion of the assessment and sue in district court for a refund. Flora v. United
States, 362 U.S. 145, 171 n.37(b) (1960). Title 18 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1) (1970) grants
district courts jurisdiction to hear such suits.
Although Shaffer could sue for a refund after only a small payment on the assess-
ment, he would have been unsuccessful in attempting to enjoin the collection because
I.R.C. § 7421 provides that no suit to restrain the assessment of any tax shall be
maintained in any court by any person. In Professional Eng'rs., Inc. v. United States,
527 F.2d 597 (4th Cir. 1975), the Fourth Circuit upheld the constitutionality of this
anti-injunction statute. In Professional Engineers, the taxpayer contended that the
Commissioner's seizure of the company's bank account for failure to pay an assess-
ment, see note 1 supra, and the taxpayer's inability to enjoin collection were unconsti-
tutional. The Fourth Circuit ruled that Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 746
(1974), which held that if a taxpayer had an adequate remedy at law in a refund action
the anti-injunction statue was not unconstitutional, was dispositive and dismissed the
suit.
Courts will permit an injunction however, if (1) the government can not prevail
under any circumstances on the merits of the assessment, (2) the taxpayer does not
have an adequate remedy at law, and (3) the taxpayer shows that irreparable harm
would result unless the injunction is permitted. Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co.,
284 U.S. 498, 510-11 (1932). See Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d 565, 577 (5th Cir.
1973) (remanded to determine if the government's wagering tax assessment had any
factual basis); Pizzarello v. United States, 408 F.2d 579, 586 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 986 (1969) (remanded to determine if a forced sale of the taxpayer's business
would result unless an injunction were permitted).
The "required records doctrine" of Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 34
(1948) is inapplicable to a wagerer's records. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39,
55-57 (1968). See note 13 infra. In Shapiro, the Court held that a merchant's daily
records were not privileged under the fifth amendment because they possessed "public
aspects." In Marchetti, the Court distinguished a wagerer's records from a merchant's
records because the wagering tax laws required gamblers to give information about
their wagering activities which was unrelated to any records that they may have
maintained and which lacked "public aspects," and the laws were directed at a group
inherently suspected of criminal activities. See Edgar, Tax Records, the Fifth Amend-
ment and the "Required Records Doctrine," 9 ST. Louis L.J. 502 (1965); see generally,
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tation of his gross income, claiming his privilege against self-
incrimination." In response to this refusal, the government moved for
an order compelling discovery or, in the alternative, for judgment on
its counterclaim for the balance of the assessment." Ruling that Shaf-
fer could not refuse to answer the questions and still maintain his
lawsuit, the district court dismissed his complaint and entered judg-
ment for the government. 2
In reversing this decision, the Fourth Circuit chose not to reach
the fifth amendment issue. 3 Instead, acting in its supervisory capac-
Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 65 COLUM.
L. REV. 681 (1965).
" Shaffer could not have refused to provide any information on the grounds of his
fifth amendment privilege unless every question would tend to incriminate him. The
Fourth Circuit recently denied such a blanket assertion of the privilege against self-
incrimination in United States v. Harrison, Civil No. 76-1255 (4th Cir., June 29, 1976),
disposition recorded 532 F.2d 752. In Harrison, the district court held the taxpayer in
contempt for refusing to provide any information or documents under an I.R.S. sum-
mons despite a court order. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the contempt finding for
failure to submit the documents to an in camera inspection because Harrison refused
to indicate why the information would tend to incriminate him, but partly remanded
the case to determine the applicability of the privilege as to each question asked. Since
Harrison provided no reason why the information would tend to incriminate him, the
district court would have to review the setting in which the government asked the
questions and their implications to determine if an answer would subject Harrison to
the danger of self-incrimination. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486
(1951).
11 528 F.2d at 921.
12 See note 3 supra.
'1 The court did not discuss Shaffer's fifth amendment claim that the dismissal
caused a forfeiture similar to the one condemned in United States v. United States
Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971). In Coin & Currency, the government instituted
a forfeiture proceeding to obtain the money that a gambler, convicted for failure to
register under I.R.C. § 4412, had in his possession at the time of his arrest. Applying
Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 60-61 (1968), in which the Court held that a
gambler could not be criminally punished for his failure to register, and Grosso v.
United States, 390 U.S. 62, 66 (1968), in which the Court held that a claim of the self-
incrimination privilege precluded a criminal conviction for failure to pay the tax be-
cause the Treasury Department did not accept payment without a properly filed re-
turn, the Court ordered the return of the money. The Court compared the forfeiture
statute, I.R.C. § 7302, to a criminal fine because the statute intended to punish only
persons significantly involved in criminal activity. 401 U.S. at 721-22.
The dismissal of Shaffer's suit would not fall directly under Coin & Currency
because the government was attempting to collect only the amount due if Shaffer had
complied with the law, whereas in Coin & Currency the wagerer could have retained
the forfeiture if he had complied with the law. See Lucia v. United States, 474 F.2d
565, 572 (5th Cir. 1973). In addition, the government did not confiscate the wagers but
only imposed a tax upon them. See Urban v. United States, 445 F.2d 641, 643 (5th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1015 (1972). The Fourth Circuit noted that Coin &
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ity, the Fourth Circuit instructed the lower court to defer the proceed-
ing until the government granted Shaffer use and derivative use im-
munity or until the running of the applicable statutes of limitation.
In this way, the court precluded the government from assessing the
tax to assist its criminal prosecution."
Other circuits considering this problem also have acted to avoid
any confrontation with the taxpayer's fifth amendment rights. In one
refund case, the court protected the government from the taxpayer's
potential abuse of civil discovery to obtain information for a criminal
proceeding that otherwise would be unavailable."
In lanelli v. Long, 6 the Third Circuit protected the taxpayer's
privilege against self-incrimination by adopting the deferral remedy,
which postpones the refund suit until the danger of self-incrimination
has ended. In Ianelli, the district court ruled that the taxpayer, who
was under indictment for violation of federal gambling laws, would
be unable to contest a jeopardy assessment for wagering taxes and a
Currency did not invalidate collection of the tax if the government did not punish the
taxpayer in a criminal sense for asserting his privilege against self-incrimination. 528
F.2d at 922.
An alternative argument to permit Shaffer to maintain his suit is that the dis-
missal tended to coerce him to incriminate himself. In Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
511 (1967), an attorney was disbarred for asserting his privilege against self-
incrimination and for failing to produce personal records at a judicial inquiry into
professional misconduct. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fifth amend-
ment protects the right of a person to remain silent and to suffer no penalty for such
silence. The Court noted that a penalty is not restricted to fine or imprisonment but
means the imposition of any sanction which makes the assertion of the privilege costly.
Dismissal of Shaffer's suit would make the assertion of his privilege costly because
he would have no further recourse to contest the assessment of the tax. But see Urban
v. United States, 445 F.2d 641, 643 (5th Cir. 1971) where the court rejected such an
argument. Urban, a wagering tax refund suit, may-be distinguished, however, because
the taxpayer was not under indictment for gambling charges and the statute of limita-
tions barred prosecutions under state gambling laws, thereby making the privilege
inapplicable. See note 35 infra.
" The differences between civil and criminal discovery indicate the need for the
court's remedy. Although discovery in civil cases is based on the premise that both
parties should have access to the full disclosure of relevant information, Hickman v.
Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947), criminal discovery is very limited. FED. R. CnmM. P.
15-17. In general, the defendant may not obtain statements of government witnesses
until after they testify in court, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970), and the government may
require the production of documents only "upon a showing of materiality to the govern-
ment's case and that the request is reasonable." FED. R. Cmi. P. 16(c). See Note,
Criminal Procedure: Pretrial Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, 5 U.C.L.A.-ALAs. L. REv. 80 (1975).
's See text accompanying notes 23-24 infra.
' 487 F.2d 317 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1040 (1973).
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levy on his property without incriminating himself.7 To protect
against this self-incrimination, the court enjoined the government
from executing its liens."5 Although the Third Circuit agreed that any
challenge to the assessment would involve incrimination, it reversed
because Ianelli had an adequate remedy at law through a refund suit.
Nevertheless, to protect the taxpayer's fifth amendment rights, the
court instructed the district court to defer the refund suit until the
conclusion of the criminal proceedings or the running of the applica-
ble statutes of limitation. 9
17 333 F. Supp. 407, 410 (W.D. Pa. 1971). I.R.C. § 6861 authorizes the Commis-
sioner to assess a deficiency in tax payment before sending a notice of deficiency,
I.R.C. § 6212(a), if he believes that assessment on collection of the tax .would be
jeopardized by delay. For a summary of the assessment procedure, see note 1 supra.
333 F. Supp. at 412-13.
" 487 F.2d at 318. A protective order limiting the time and place of discovery
would have the same effect as a deferral. District courts are granted power under FED.
R. Civ. P. 26(c)(2) to issue such orders for good cause, which would be that the infor-
mation is privileged. The rules of evidence determine whether information is privil-
eged under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), which prohibits the discovery of such informa-
tion. United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953). The order would postpone dis-
covery in the refund suit until the conclusion of the related criminal proceeding. See
text accompanying notes 36-39 infra. Nevertheless, the taxpayer should not reveal
incriminating information without claiming the privilege, for he may not invoke the
privilege at a later date unless he is in real danger of further incrimination. Rogers v.
United States, 340 U.S. 367, 374 (1951); In re Master Key Litigation, 507 F.2d 292,
294 (9th Cir. 1974); see Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (failure to claim
self-incrimination privilege on tax return precluded assertion of the privilege at trial).
If the district court refused to grant the protective order, the taxpayer could request
a writ of mandamus, appeal under the collateral order doctrine, or ask the criminal
court to enjoin further discovery in the civil action. See Note, Federal Courts-
Discovery-Stay of Discovery in Civil Court to Protect Proceedings in Concurrent
Criminal Action-The Pattern of Remedies, 66 MICH. L. Rv. 738 (1968).
In limiting the scope of discovery, the district court may require that the deposi-
tions, after being sealed, be opened only by order of the court. FED. R. CIv. P.
26(c)(4)&(6). To limit the government's discovery to non-privileged material in a wag-
ering tax refund suit, however, would impair its defense seriously because knowledge
of the taxpayer's wagering activity is essential to determine the correct liability. The
court also might order interrogatories to be held under seal until the conclusion of the
criminal proceeding, McSurely v. McClellan, 426 F.2d 664, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1970), but
this limitation would do little to advance discovery because it would be the last step
before a deferral of the proceedings. This procedure would, however, preserve testi-
mony until after the deferral. The practical effect of an order to seal the depositions
would be minimal because the government is a party to both actions. Although the
court might prohibit the use of the information in the criminal proceeding, to control
the use of leads obtained from the information would be difficult. The Fourth Circuit's
remedy of use and derivative use immunity, however, does control the use of secondary
evidence obtained from the disputed information because the prosecutor in a subse-
quent proceeding must prove that his information is untainted by evidence obtained
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
When confronted with this same problem in Thomas v. United
States,2" the Fifth Circuit did not instruct the district court on the
specific remedy for the wagerer's dilemma. In Thomas, the govern-
ment served the taxpayer with twenty-one interrogatories, ten of
which the taxpayer refused to answer on the ground of his privilege
against self-incrimination. The district court dismissed Thomas' re-
fund suit despite the argument that the answers would be incriminat-
ing with regard to an action pending against him for violation of state
gambling laws. The Fifth Circuit reversed, agreeing with Thomas
that since his disobedience was based on his fifth amendment privi-
lege, any sanction imposed should permit him the opportunity to
prove that the assessment was erroneous.' The court, however, did
not state a specific remedy, but left its formulation to the district
court's discretion in light of Ianelli and Shaffer.2 2 Nevertheless, the
Fifth Circuit's ruling indicates that the taxpayer had a right to main-
tain his silence and his lawsuit. Moreover, the court did not rule in a
supervisory capacity, as the Fourth Circuit did in Shaffer, but acted
as a court declaring substantive law.
Although the taxpayer may need protection of his rights in civil
cases, at times the government requires protection from the abuse of
civil discovery by the taxpayer. In Russell v. United States, 2 an
income tax refund suit, the taxpayer requested admissions from the
government that were relevant to his appeal from a related criminal
conviction. The district court granted the government's request for a
deferral to prevent Russell from obtaining information through civil
discovery that was not available through criminal discovery. Balanc-
under a grant of immunity. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1972). See
Donnici, The Privilege Against Self-incrimination in Civil Pre-Trial Discovery: The
Use of Protective Orders to Avoid Constitutional Issues, 3 U.S.F.L. REv. 12 (1968).
2' 531 F.2d 746 (5th Cir. 1976).
21 Id. at 749. Although the Fourth Circuit did not discuss a due process issue in
Shaffer, the dismissal of Shaffer's suit arguably would work as a denial of due process.
The Supreme Court recognized that dismissal of the plaintiff's action in a civil suit
could be a denial of due process in Societe Int'l Pour Partic. Indus. et Commerc., S.A.
v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). There, the plaintiff was unable to produce certain
documents during discovery because production would have resulted in criminal liabil-
ity under Swiss law. Balancing the government's interests against those of the plain-
tiff, the Court held that the dismissal of the suit despite the plaintiffs good faith
attempt to cooperate during discovery denied due process. Id. at 213. Similarly, Shaf-
fer's assertion of his fifth amendment privilege was in good faith because of the real
danger of self-incrimination. See generally Rendleman, The New Due Process: Rights
and Remedies, 63 Ky. L.J. 532 (1975).
12 531 F.2d at 750.
- 37 A.F.T.R.2d (P-H) 76-617 (10th Cir. Apr. 5, 1976).
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ing the government's interest in preparing the appeal without the
intrusions of civil discovery against Russell's interest in a prompt
determination of his income tax liability, the court upheld the discre-
tionary grant of the deferral. 2 The court may have balanced the
denial of Russell's liberty against his proprietary interest in the tax.
Although Russell expressly denied any claim of the privilege against
self-incrimination, the court listed the protection of Russell's privi-
lege as one of the deciding factors.
Traditionally, courts considering a motion to dismiss for failure to
comply with an order compelling discovery5 or a motion to stay a
proceeding5 balance the interests of the parties involved. In Ianelli,
Shaffer and Russell, the courts balanced the interests of the govern-
ment and the taxpayer but reached different solutions by emphasiz-
ing different interests. The Third Circuit in lanelli was primarily
concerned with the government's interest in the collection of the tax
without undue judicial interference.Y The court denied the injunction
because it found that the jeopardy assessment was a bona fide at-
tempt to collect the tax.2 8 The court allowed deferral of the proposed
refund suit, however, to permit the taxpayer to contest assessment
without incriminating himself.2 This remedy emphasizes the protec-
tion of Ianelli's fifth amendment privilege over his interest in a
prompt determination of tax liability."
The Third Circuit's deferral remedy may have been overly broad.
Although the Supreme Court has affirmed the inherent power of
courts to stay proceedings, the Court also noted that the stay should
be restricted to a moderate time period and reinstated if necessary."
The Third Circuit ordered a deferral of the proceedings "until the
21 Id. at $ 76-1372.
21 See, e.g., Scarver v. Allen, 457 F.2d 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1972); Dorsey v. Academy
Moving & Storage, Inc., 423 F.2d 858, 860-61 (5th Cir. 1970); Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d
669, 671 (2d Cir. 1957); Comment, Standards for Imposition of Discovery Sanctions,
27 ME. L. REv. 247 (1975).
2 Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936).
" The government contended that I.R.C. § 7421 prohibited the injunction. See
note 8 supra. In Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 737 (1973), the Supreme
Court stated that the purpose of the statute was to facilitate the expeditious collection
of taxes with a minimum of pre-enforcement judicial interference.
21 Ianelli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317 (3d Cir. 1973).
29 Id. at 318.
11 For a discussion of the plaintiff's interests in actions where the government is
not a party, see Kaminsky, Preventing Unfair Use of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination in Private Civil Litigation: A Critical Analysis, 39 BROOKLYN L. REv. 121
(1972).
22 Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936).
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
conclusion of the related criminal proceeding. 32 If the taxpayer or
government appealed the decision in the criminal case, this period of
time might extend for several years.3 A more moderate solution
would be to order an initial stay of proceedings until the conclusion
of the criminal trial, when the stay would be reviewed if a party
requested a renewal.3 4 The trial court then would inspect the disputed
documents or review the information in an in camera hearing to
determine if the danger of self-incrimination still existed. 5 If the
information had been disclosed in the criminal trial, it is difficult to
see how the taxpayer could be injured by its disclosure through dis-
covery. If the danger of incrimination remained, however, the court
could extend the deferral.
By contrast, the Tenth Circuit in Russell valued the public inter-
est in the criminal prosecution over Russell's interest in a prompt
conclusion of the refund action. Although there is an important pub-
lic interest in the enforcement of criminal laws, 3 this interest would
appear to be outweighed if the taxpayer's ability to present his tax
refund case is seriously impaired. The Tenth Circuit might have in-
quired whether the delay would affect the availability of evidence or
impose an undue hardship on Russell. If the delay had had such an
effect, the court could have provided that the government agree to
appropriate stipulations or permit Russell to continue discovery in
areas not related to his criminal case. This solution would have pro-
tected the criminal prosecution while insuring that the government's
purpose for the delay was not to hinder Russell's refund suit.
In Thomas, the Fifth Circuit emphasized the public interest in
protection from overreaching by the government.3 7 The court ex-
32 Ianelli v. Long, 487 F.2d 317, 318 (3d Cir. 1973).
3 In Dellinger v. Mitchell, 442 F.2d 782, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the court reversed
the grant of a stay in a civil proceeding related to a criminal action for this reason.
3' Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 257 (1936).
3 A claimant may not assert the privilege against self-incrimination when the
reason for the privilege no longer exists. United States v. Goodman, 289 F.2d 256, 259
(4th Cir., 1961), rev'g 178 F. Supp. 338 (E.D. Va. 1959), vacated, 368 U.S. 14 (1961)
(per curiam) (remanded to permit the government to withdraw its application for an
order to compel testimony).
3, Campbell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478, 487 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S.
955 (1963).
531 F.2d at 749. The Supreme Court in Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121
(1954), expressed a similar concern and cautioned courts of appeals reviewing estima-
tions of tax liability to bear "constantly in mind the difficulties that arise when cicum-
stantial evidence as to guilt is the chief weapon of a method that is itself only an
approximation." Id. at 129. The government uses an approximation in "net worth"
cases such as Holland because the taxpayer's records are inadequate to determine any
19771 - 727
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pressed concern that the government might calculate an excessive tax
assessment and frame incriminating interrogatories to force the tax-
payer to choose between maintaining his refund suit or exposing him-
self to criminal liability." Although the court denied Thomas the use
of his money during the deferral because the government had col-
lected a part of the wagering tax assessment by seizure, the deferral
permitted Thomas to contest the seizure at a later date rather than
concede the validity of the assessment. If Thomas succeeded in his
action, the government would pay interest on the seized money,39
partly alleviating Thomas' loss of the use of his money. Further, the
deferral allowed Thomas an opportunity to recover his money without
forcing him to provide evidence that might have assisted the govern-
ment in its prosecution.
The Fourth Circuit's remedy reflects a similar concern for
potential governmental abuse of power through civil discovery to pro-
mote a concurrent criminal investigation. If the government granted
immunity, there would be little doubt that the purpose of the assess-
ment was to collect the tax. Refusal to grant immunity, however,
would imply an attempt to coerce the taxpayer into self-
incrimination. Therefore, the Shaffer decision indicates an interest in
the integrity of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure relating to
discovery" and the protections they provide for the accused.
Although the Fourth Circuit's instruction to defer the proceeding
until the statutes of limitation had expired if the government
income tax liability. To sustain its calculation, the government must establish the net
value of the defendant's assets at the beginning of the tax year in question. That figure
is deducted from his net worth at the end of the tax year and all non-deductible
expenditures are added. The final figure is the defendant's taxable income if the
government's proof either (1) negates all nontaxable sources of income or (2) demon-
strates a likely taxable source which generated the income. United States v. Bethea,
537 F.2d 1187, 1188-89 (4th Cir. 1976).
The Fourth Circuit recently applied the Supreme Court's admonition in Bethea,
holding that the government failed to prove the taxpayer's taxable income. In Bethea,
the taxpayer testified that his deceased brother, a narcotics dealer, left a large sum of
cash in Bethea's safe deposit box. The government contended, however, that Bethea
used the disreputable "cash hoard" defense. See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 236 F.2d
260 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 909 (1956) (money hidden or buried); Mighell v.
United States, 233 F.2d 731 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 832 (1956) (buried cash).
The court rejected the government's assertion because Bethea's contention was corro-
borated by his brother's attorney who testified that he had seen the deceased with large
sums of cash, and reversed the conviction.
" Thomas v. United States, 531 F.2d 746, 749 (5th Cir. 1976).
"' I.R.C. § 6611 requires that interest be paid on overpayments of tax if the refund
occurs more than forty-five days after the return is filed.
10 FED. R. CRIM. P. 15-17. See note 14 supra.
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declined to grant immunity would be subject to the same criticism
as the deferral remedy ordered by the Third Circuit,4 the immunity
remedy does allow the tax collection to proceed without delay. A
grant of immunity, however, would force the criminal prosecutor to
prove that his case was untainted by evidence obtained under the
grant. Thus, the government might have to sacrifice a criminal prose-
cution to collect a tax more promptly. Since the government may
resume the civil suit when the danger of self-incrimination has ended,
it probably would decline the Fourth Circuit's invitation to grant
immunity.4"
Another criticism of the Fourth Circuit's remedy is that it is too
restrictive. Under its terms, a wagerer under indictment conceivably
might institute a refund action in the hope of gaining immunity. He
would at least postpone payment of his full tax liability until his
appeals were exhausted or the applicable statutes of limitation had
expired. A remedy with greater flexibility would require the govern-
ment to grant use and derivative use immunity before continuing
discovery or to defer the proceeding until the conclusion of the crimi-
nal trial, with a provision for review of the deferral at that time, or
to defer until the running of the applicable statutes of limitation.
This remedy balances the public and private interests because it
protects the taxpayer from the use of privileged information at his
criminal prosecution, and provides an opportunity to conclude the
refund suit within a reasonable time if the taxpayer is no longer in
danger of self-incrimination.
B. Review of a Tax Court Finding that Property Was Held
Primarily for Sale in the Ordinary Course of Business.
Section 7482 of the Internal Revenue Code grants the federal
courts of appeals jurisdiction to review Tax Court decisions "in the
same manner and to the same extent as decisions of the district
1, The Fourth Circuit ordered a stay of the proceedings until the government
granted immunity or until all applicable statutes of limitation had run. 528 F.2d at
922. A more moderate period of time would be until the conclusion of the criminal trial,
when the deferral could be reviewed. See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
"' Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3152-56, 3161-74 and 28
U.S.C. § 604 (Supp. V 1975), the government must bring a defendant to trial within a
limited time after his arraignment or risk dismissal of its case. Since this time progres-
sively declines to only sixty days after July 1, 1979, the government would incur only
a brief delay before resuming a related tax suit and probably will decline future similar
invitations to grant immunity.
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courts in civil actions tried without a jury."' Accordingly, the courts
of appeals may not reverse the Tax Court's findings of fact unless
"clearly erroneous." 2 Until recently, the Fourth Circuit had followed
the clearly erroneous rule with respect to the Tax Court's finding that
property was held primarily for sale in the ordinary course of busi-
ness3 and had reviewed the finding as a question of fact. 4 In Turner
v. Commissioner,5 however, the Fourth Circuit reversed its position
and held that a finding of the taxpayer's purpose for holding the
property was an ultimate fact which would be treated as a conclusion
of law.' This holding, which resulted from the Commissioner's invita-
tion to treat the finding as a conclusion of law,7 permitted the court
to review the decision without the restraints of the clearly erroneous
rule.
In Turner, the taxpayer bought three tracts of land on three differ-
ent occasions which he subsequently sold in three separate transac-
tions to a development company that he had organized. Turner ac-
quired, subdivided and improved the first two tracts with the intent
that his company would develop them. In effect, Turner financed the
first two purchases for his company because it lacked financial stabil-
I Congress passed I.R.C. § 7482 in reaction to Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S.
489, 501 (1943). In Dobson, the Supreme Court held that the Tax Court's conclusions
of fact must be sustained if they have a rational basis. See REPORT OF THE WAYS &
MEANS COMM. ON THE TAX REvISION AcT OF 1948, H.R. Doc. No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 16 (1948).
1 FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Under the clearly erroneous rule, an appellate court may
not reverse a finding of fact unless after a review of the evidence the court is left with
the definite and firm conviction that the lower court committed an error. United States
v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). See 5A MooRE's FEDERAL
PRACTICE 52.03 at 2613-77 (2d ed. 1975); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTIcE
AND PROCEDURE 2583-91 at 725-73 (1971).
I.R.C. § 1221(1) provides that property held by the taxpayer for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business is not a capital asset. Only capital assets
receive capital gains treatment on gain from their disposition. I.R.C. §§ 1202, 1222(9).
"Primarily" means "of first importance" or "principally." Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S.
569, 572 (1966). See Bernstein, "Primarily for Sale"; A Semantic Snare, 20 STAN. L.
REv. 1093 (1968); Rubin, Capital Gain Treatment of Real Estate Sales: Implications
of the Malat Case, 16 TUL. TAX INST. 421 (1967); Note, "Primarily for Sale" in
L R. C. Sections 1221 and 1231 Held to Mean "Principally for Sale" Rather Than
"Substantially for Sale"-Malat v. Riddell, 64 Mich. L. Rev. 1610 (1966).
'Industrial Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 481 F.2d 609, 610 (4th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam), affg 344 F. Supp. 870 (D.S.C. 1970), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1143 (1974);
Tidwell v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 864, 866 (4th Cir. 1962).




ityA Turner had no plans to subdivide the third tract at the time of
purchase, and made no improvements to it; but the advent of munici-
pal services to the tract and an adjacent farm that the development
company owned made this tract ideal for development. One year
after this occurrence, Turner sold the third tract to his company for
cash, a promissory note and a conveyance of seventy-five acres of the
farm.9
The Tax Court found that Turner was in the business of buying
and selling real estate for subdivision and development, that all of the
tracts were acquired and held in the ordinary course of this business,
and that, therefore, they were not capital assets. I" Turner acquiesced
in this conclusion as to the first two tracts, but contended that the
third tract was a capital asset.'1
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Turner, concluding that he pur-
chased the third tract as an investor and not as a dealer.'2 In reaching
The method used to sell the lots to individuals indicated Turner's close relation-
ship to the company. Turner leased the lots to his company for 99 years at an annual
rent of six percent of the redemption price. When the company sold the house which
it had built on the lot, it assigned the lease to the buyer who agreed not to redeem the
lease for five years, at which time he could obtain a fee simple. In consideration for
this agreement, Turner reduced the ground rent to five percent for the five year period.
33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1169. I.R.C. § 1055 permitted the homeowners to treat a qualified
ground lease arrangement as a sale subject to a mortgage.
The parties agreed to delay a formal conveyance for two years to facilitate
rezoning the seventy-five acres for commercial use. 540 F.2d at 1254.
33 T.C.M.(CCH) at 1185.
" A real estate dealer may acquire land as a long term investment and treat his
profit as a capital gain. Municipal Bond Corp. v. Commissioner, 382 F.2d 184, 188 (8th
Cir. 1967); Scheuber v. Commissioner, 371 F.2d 996, 998 (7th Cir. 1967). See Looney,
The Tax Effect of Subdividing Real Estate: Dealer or Investor? 63 ILL. B.J. 66 (1974).
2 Although the Fourth Circuit did not mention the factors which the courts con-
sider to determine whether property was held in the ordinary course of business, the
discussion presented in the opinion indicates that it did consider them. These factors
include the purpose in acquiring the asset, the frequency, continuity, and size of the
sales, the activities of the seller in disposing of the property, the extent of improve-
ments to the property, the proximity of the sale to the purchase, and the reason the
taxpayer held the property at the t time of the sale. William B. Howell, 57 T.C. 546,
554 (1972).
Courts also use these factors to determine whether a taxpayer is in the business
of selling real estate. In Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 416 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 64 (1976), the court stated that when the guidelines are
used for that purpose, the most significant factors are the frequency and substantiality
of the sales. Substantiality is determined from the proportion of the taxpayer's total
annual income derived from the sales in question. United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d
905, 910 (5th Cir. 1969). The lack of sales promotion in Turner was not important
because of Turner's close relationship to the company. Cf. Jersey Land & Dev. Corp.
v. United States, 539 F.2d 311, 315 (3d Cir. 1976) (presence or lack of promotional
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its decision, the court of appeals made a plenary review of the facts
and focused its attention on Turner's intent when purchased the third
tract. 13 Indications of Turner's intent at the time of purchase were
that the tract was rural farmland and that Turner failed to improve
the land before the sale." These facts caused the Fourth Circuit to
reverse the Tax Court's finding.
The Fourth Circuit's decision to treat the Tax Court's finding as
a conclusion of law is not without support. The Fifth Circuit, in
deciding whether to review the finding of purpose as a matter of law,
has reasoned that the finding was based on undisputed facts and that
the court of appeals could interpret and reason from those facts as
well as the Tax Court.'5 The Third Circuit has noted that the question
activity is irrelevant in commercial land transactions because the information is
usually known to potential purchases).
The Fourth Circuit also held that the severty-five acres should be treated as
income to Turner on the date of the agreement because he was the equitable owner at
that time. The court reasoned that the sale was complete for tax purposes although
legal title had not passed. In determining if a sale is complete for tax purposes, courts
have considered whether the burdens of ownership have passed or alternatively
whether the parties have entered a binding contract. Dettmers v. Commissioner, 430
F.2d 1019, 1023 (6th Cir. 1970), aff'g 51 T.C. 290 (1969) (stocks); Commissioner v.
Union Pac. R.R., 86 F.2d 637, 639 (2d Cir. 1936) (real property). Establishing the date
of the completed transaction in this manner prevents a taxpayer from manipulating
the date of the formal closing. Such manipulation would distort income if the taxpayer
delayed the formal closing until a year in which he had a low income.
"1 The Tax Court had focused its attention on Turner's intent at the time of the
sale and considered Turner and his company to be "joint participants" in the develop-
ment of the third tract. Viewing the third sale as part of a continuing scheme to acquire
adjacent properties and enhance their value by joining and developing them, the Tax
Court found that Turner's failure to improve the third tract was not attributable to
any intent to hold the tract as an investment, but resulted from an external factor.
The cause was Turner's inability to acquire, despite his attempts to do so, the adjacent
farm that his company subsequently purchased. 33 T.C.M.(CCH) at 1184. The Tax
Court considered a term in the agreement between Turner and his company which
stated that the company would obtain commercial rezoning, as indicative of Turner's
intent to profit eventually from the sale through the land's development rather than
through its market appreciation.
In Tibbals v. United States, 362 F.2d 266 (Ct. Cl. 1966), the Court of Claims also
concentrated on the purpose for which the taxpayer held the property at the time of
sale, but concluded that the taxpayer sold the land as an investment because his
purpose in holding the property had changed.
'1 But see Jersey Land & Dev. Corp. v. United States, 539 F.2d 311, 315-16 (3d
Cir. 1976), where the Third Circuit stated that the purpose for holding the property at
the time of sale was controlling rather than the initial purpose at acquisition. Turner
however, may be distinguished because the taxpayer in Jersey Land had made exten-
sive improvements to the property.
11 United States v. Winthrop, 417 F.2d 905, 910 (5th Cir. 1969). The court stated
that although the district court's finding had factual underpinnings, it was inherently
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of intent is an ultimate fact or legal inference to be drawn from other
facts and.thus is subject to review outside the rule. 6 The Ninth and
Tenth Circuits, however, consider intent to be a question of fact for
the lower court, 7 and the Sixth Circuit has interpreted Commissioner
v. Dubersteins as precluding plenary review of the Tax Court's find-
ing of any ultimate fact."
In Duberstein, the Supreme Court upheld under the clearly erro-
neous rule the Tax Court's finding that a transfer of property was a
gift under section 102(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. The facts were
not disputed; nevertheless, the Supreme Court noted that the Tax
Court had applied not only legal reasoning, but also its knowledge of
human experience to determine the intent of the transferor.2' Al-
though the Fourth Circuit did not discuss Duberstein in Turner,', the
a question of law. See Biedenharn Realty Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 409, 416 n.25
(5th Cir. 1976) (power to review the finding as to purpose was plenary and not limited
by the clearly erroneous rule).
19 Pennroad Corp. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 325, 328 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 958 (1962). See note 2 supra.
11 Los Angeles Extension Co. v. United States, 315 F.2d 1, 3 (9th Cir. 1963) (a
review of the finding as to the purpose has little precedental value because each case
must be decided on its facts). See Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 285, 289 (10th
Cir. 1952) (purpose is essentially a question of fact). But see Colorado Springs Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1189 (10th Cir. 1974) (reviewed application of
Internal Revenue Code to the facts outside clearly erroneous rule because could draw
needed conclusions as well as the lower court).
" 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
" Buckeye Union Cas. Co. v. Commissioner, 448 F.2d 228, 233 (6th Cir. 1971).
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).
21 In Gantt v. Unted States, 528 F.2d 354 (4th Cir. 1975), the Fourth Circuit
followed Duberstein and refused to overturn a jury verdict reached upon correct in-
structions because reasonable men could reach different conclusions on the issue. The
issue was whether Gantt paid guaranteed loans for his closely-held corporation, which
employed him but provided no salary, primarily to protect his status as an employee
rather than as an investor. Gantt had deducted his payment of the loan as a business
bad debt but the Commissioner contended that the payment was a non-business bad
debt, I.R.C. § 166(d)(1), subject to the $1,000 limitation of I.R.C. § 1211(b)(1) (1954)
(amended 1976). The Fourth Circuit upheld the jury finding that Gantt's primary
motive for the payment was not to protect his employee status. See Generes v. United
States, 405 U.S. 93, 103 (1972) (to (deduct a loan to a corporation, an investor-
employee must prove that his primary or dominant motive was to protect his employee
status); .Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291, 1294 (10th Cir. 1974) (business bad
debt deduction denied because taxpayer loaned $199,000 to his company which pro-
vided $6,000 or less in annual salary); but cf. Hagan v. United States, 221 F. Supp.
248 (W.D. ARk. 1963) (deducted loss on stock purchased in customer's business to
insure that customer would buy supplies exclusively from taxpayer); Geraldine R.
Mann, 34 T.C.M.(CCH) 377 (1975) (employee-investor owning 50 percent of company
obtained all of her income as salary); Isidor jaffe, 26 T.C.M.(CCH) 1063 (1967)
(employee-investor unable to obtain like employment elsewhere).
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cases are different because § 102(a) uses the term "gift" in its col-
loquial sense rather than as a part of common law terminology'
whereas "primarily held for sale to customers in the ordinary course
of business" in § 1221(1) is a legal term which requires a knowledge
of the tax code for its interpretation.2 Therefore, Duberstein is distin-
guishable from Turner because in Turner there is no need to rely on
any unique expertise of the Tax Court.
24
The Fourth Circuit's decision to review the finding outside the
clearly erroneous rule also may be justified because the Tax Court
merely applied a standard of law to undisputed facts. A court of
appeals should not ignore an erroneous application of the law merely
because the lower court labeled its conclusion as a finding of fact.2
If the reviewing court clearly states why the lower court applied an
incorrect standard of law, that clarification would reduce the number
of appeals and avoid litigation.
The Fourth Circuit's opinion, however, did not clarify the stan-
dard of law because the court did not indicate why the Tax Court
applied an erroneous standard of law. The Fourth Circuit only re-
viewed the facts of the case and reached a decision contrary to the
The court also denied Gantt's contention that he was in the trade or business of
promoting, organizing and dealing in corporations because he did not develop them
for a fee or intend to sell them when profitable. See Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S.
193, 202 (1963) (merely devoting one's time and efforts to a corporation is not, in itself,
a trade or business); Bernard v. Commissioner, 516 F.2d 862, 864 (9th Cir. 1975) (per
curiam), aff'g 32 T.C.M.(CCH) 297 (1973) (principal goal in enterprise was apprecia-
tion of investment); but cf. Giblin v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d 692 (5th Cir. 1955)
(corporations established for limited purpose and duration or interest sold).
If Gantt had financed the company himself and organized it under I.R.C. § 1244,
he could have deducted his loss from ordinary income without the $1,000 limitation of
I.R.C. § 1211(b)(1) (1954) (amended 1976). Section 1244 permits the deduction of a
loss on the stock on a properly organized small company to be deducted as a loss from
a non-capital asset. See J. Paul Smyers, 57 T.C. 189, 198-99 (1971); but cf. Hollenbeck
v. Commissioner, 422 F.2d 2 (9th Cir. 1970) (plan disqualified because pre-existing
notes held to be capital); Raymond G. Hill, 51 T.C. 621, 629 (1969) (corporation's
payment of guaranteed loan was to relieve taxpayer of personal liability); Taylor
Section 1244: Avoiding its Problems, 29 N.Y.U. INsT. TAx. 201 (1971); Smith & Tan-
nenbaum, Second Circuit defines components of a well written plan under Section
1244, 29 J. TAx. 66 (1968); Note, Federal Taxation-Failure to Obtain Ordinary Loss
Deduction for Section 1244 Stock, 45 TUL. L. R.v. 642 (1971).
1 Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 285 (1960).
2 See note 3 supra.
11 See Haverly v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 1041, 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1974)
(Duberstein concerned meaning of "gift" exclusively), rev'd on other grounds, 513 F.2d
224 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 912 (1975).
Ritter v. Morton, 513 F.2d 942, 949 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 947 (1975);
see text accompanying note 15 supra.
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Tax Court's decision. As a result, the decision merely tended to blur
the division of responsibilities between the Tax Court and the courts
of appeals because the lower courts often must use legal reasoning
even to find evidentiary facts. 8
C. Denial of Interest Deduction for the Repurchase Premium
Paid on Securities Having Characteristics of Both Bonds and
Stock.
Although a corporation may deduct as an interest expense a re-
purchase premium paid on a bond,' it may not deduct a repurchase
premium paid on stock.2 In Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac
Railroad Co. v. Commissioner,3 the Fourth Circuit considered
whether the repurchase premium paid on securities having character-
istics of both bonds and stock could be deducted as an interest ex-
pense. The court held that the premium could not be deducted be-
cause it was attributable to the stock characteristics of the securities.'
In Richmond Railroad, the taxpayer had issued securities during
the nineteenth century which had attributes of both bonds and stock.
The securities resembled bonds in that they entitled their holders to
a fixed interest payment or "guaranteed dividend," which was paya-
ble regardless of earnings and which was secured by first liens on the
railroad's property. The securities, however, also carried the same
voting rights as common stock, and if common stock dividends
equalled the "guaranteed dividends," common stockholders and se-
curity holders shared equally in additional distributions. Further-
more, in the event of dissolution the security holders would share
ratably in the assets after the common stockholders received par
value for their shares.
From 1962 to 1964 the Railroad repurchased some of the hybrid
21 Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact Based on Documentary
or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REV. 506, 527-28 (1963). See generally 9 C. WmGHT
& A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PaOCEDURE 2587-89 at 740-59 (1971); 5A
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 52.03 at 2613-77 (2d ed. 1975); Weiner, The Civil NonJury
Trial and the Law Fact Distinction, 55 CALIF. L. REV. 1020 (1967).
1 I.R.C. § 163.
2 I.R.C. § 311 provides that a corporation may not recognize a gain or loss on the
distribution of property for its stock. Treas. Reg. § 1.311-1(a), T.D. 7209, 1972-2 C.B.
204, 206-07, provides that § 311 includes distributions made in the redemption of stock
and I.R.C. § 317(a) provides that "property" includes money.
528 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1975).
1 Id. at 919.
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securities at prices far in excess of their face value5 and claimed a
deduction for the excess of the purchase price over the par price as a
bond premium.' The Fourth Circuit held that whether the securities
were debt or equity for the purposes of the Internal Revenue Code
depended upon the provisions of the securities most relevant to the
transaction.7 Concluding that no bond, no matter how well secured,
would sell for six times its face value, the court denied the interest
deductions, reasoning that the high premium reflected the right of
security holders to participate in earnings, a normal characteristic of
stock. In addition, the hybrid securities lacked a fixed maturity date
and sinking fund reserve, which are standard characteristics of corpo-
rate debt.'
The Fourth Circuit also denied two other contentions that the
railroad presented; first, that the repurchase was analogous to the
reacquisition of convertible bonds and therefore the premium was
deductible without allocation to the stock characteristics;9 and sec-
I The face value of the hybrid securities was $25. The railroad paid an average of
$112, $118 and $164 per share for the securities acquired in 1962, 1963 and 1964,
respectively. Id. at 919.
' The railroad also claimed an interest deduction for the dividends paid in excess
of the "guaranteed dividend." The court denied this deduction because the securities
were stock in regard to this dividend payment. See text accompanying notes 7-8 supra.
In an earlier case involving the same securities, Helvering v. Richmond, F. & P.R.R.,
90 F.2d 971, 975 (4th Cir. 1937), the court permitted the railroad to deduct the
"guaranteed dividends" as interest on debt because the securities were bonds for the
purposes of that payment. The court emphasized the holder's priority over secured
creditors to the corporate assets in the event of dissolution, and noted that the
"guaranteed dividends" were payable whether earned or not. The dividends paid in
excess of guaranteed portion, however, were paid only if earned.
I Other courts have considered a similar problem in determining whether instru-
ments were debt or equity. In Austin Village, Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 741, 744
(6th Cir. 1970), the Sixth Circuit listed the normal provisions of a debt instrument as
an unconditional promise to pay, a fixed maturity date, an interest rate and schedule
for repayment, a security provision, and a sinking fund to provide funds for repayment.
In Richmond Railroad, although the securities had only an interest rate and security
provision, the absence of the other provisions was less important in construing the
securities to be stock for the purposes of the transaction than the presence of a right
to participate in current earnings in the manner of a common stockholder. See McCull-
ers, Debt/Equity Classification Standards, 48 TAXEs 482 (1970).
1 Nevertheless, even if the securities had contained these provisions, the court
probably would not have changed its decision but would have compared the guaran-
teed premium, $1.75 per share in 1964, to the dividend attributable to current earnings,
$4.25 per qhare in 1964, and concluded that the security holders demanded such a high
price for their securities because of their right to participate in current earnings.
I In 1964, when the railroad repurchased the securities, a company could deduct
the entire repurchase premium on a convertible bond without allocating the premium
between the interest payable under the bonds and their conversion feature. The Fourth
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ond, that even if the securities were stock, the railroad could deduct
the premium as an ordinary and necessary business expense ' because
the repurchase facilitated management of the railroad property by
removing the first liens of the securities on that property. The court
rejected the first argument, finding that the securities were not analo-
gous to convertible bonds because the securities entitled their holders
to vote as a common stockholder and participate in current earnings,
whereas a convertible bondholder might partake of these benefits
only after the conversion. As to the second argument, the deduction
of the premium as a business expense would require a showing of
"dire necessity,"" a requirement which the railroad did not meet
Circuit allowed such a deduction without allocation in Head Ski Co. v. United States,
454 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1972) (per curiam), aff'g 323 F. Supp. 1383 (D. Md. 1971), for a
repurchase that occurred before 1969. In 1969, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 249 which
requires a company which repurchases a convertible bond to allocate the premium paid
for the convertible bond between the payment for interest and the payment attributa-
ble to the conversion feature. Congress passed I.R.C. § 249 in reaction to Roberts &
Porter, Inc. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1962), where the court allowed a
deduction of the entire premium. H.R. Rep. No. 91-143, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 111
(1969), reprinted in [1969] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1645, 1759-60.
The railroad may have committed a tactical error in failing to contend that even
if the entire repurchase premium were not deductible, at least that portion attributable
to the interest payments under the securities bond characteristics was deductible. The
Fourth Circuit emphasized that the right to participate in current earnings was the
most important reason for the high repurchase price, so it might have permitted the
railroad to use the ratio of the "guaranteed dividend" to the total distribution as a
reasonable allocation. For the seven percent securities in 1964, the "guaranteed divi-
dends" were twenty-five percent of the total distribution. 528 F.2d at 919. This percen-
tage would have permitted a significant deduction for the railroad. On the other hand,
if the court used the computation that the Treasury Regulation for § 249 employs to
determine the amount of the repurchase premium attributable to the interest feature
of convertible bonds, an amount limited to the interest payable in one year, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.249-1(d)(2) (1973), the railroad would have been limited to a $1.75 deduction per
security. Since the repurchase premium varied between $118 and $164, this computa-
tion would not result in a significant deduction.
" I.R.C. § 162 requires that a deductible business expense be both "ordinary and
necessary." The Supreme Court has noted two ways that a taxpayer may prove an
expense is "ordinary," either by showing that the expense is normal, usual or custom-
ary for the taxpayer, or, if it occurs but once in a taxpayer's lifetime, that the transac-
tion causing the expense was a common or frequent occurrence in the type of business
involved. Deputy v. duPont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940). Even if the railroad's expense
were ordinary because it occurred in three successive years, it was not "necessary"
because it did not arise from a "dire necessity." See text accompanying note 11 infra.
" The court required such a showing because the railroad attempted to use an
exception to I.R.C. § 311 which provides that a corporation may not recognize a gain
or loss on the distribution of property for its stock. Dire necessity means that the
company could not continue its operations unless it incurred the expense. H.&G.
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